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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a provably stable architecture for Neural Ordinary Differential Equations
(ODEs) which achieves non-trivial adversarial robustness under white-box adversarial attacks even when
the network is trained naturally. For most existing defense methods withstanding strong white-box attacks,
to improve robustness of neural networks, they need to be trained adversarially, hence have to strike a
trade-off between natural accuracy and adversarial robustness. Inspired by dynamical system theory, we
design a stabilized neural ODE network named SONet whose ODE blocks are skew-symmetric and proved
to be input-output stable. With natural training, SONet can achieve comparable robustness with the state-
of-the-art adversarial defense methods, without sacrificing natural accuracy. Even replacing only the first
layer of a ResNet by such a ODE block can exhibit further improvement in robustness, e.g., under PGD-20
(`∞ = 0.031) attack on CIFAR-10 dataset, it achieves 91.57% and natural accuracy and 62.35% robust
accuracy, while a counterpart architecture of ResNet trained with TRADES achieves natural and robust
accuracy 76.29% and 45.24%, respectively. To understand possible reasons behind this surprisingly good
result, we further explore the possible mechanism underlying such an adversarial robustness. We show that
the adaptive stepsize numerical ODE solver, DOPRI5, has a gradient masking effect that fails the PGD
attacks which are sensitive to gradient information of training loss; on the other hand, it cannot fool the CW
attack of robust gradients and the SPSA attack that is gradient-free. This provides a new explanation that the
adversarial robustness of ODE-based networks mainly comes from the obfuscated gradients in numerical
ODE solvers.
1 Introduction
Adversarial robustness is a central object of study in machine learning [CAP+19, ZSS19, MMS+18, KW18],
computer security [SBBR16, MC17], and many other domains [SKN+18, XWZ+17, JL17]. In machine
learning, study of adversarial robustness has led to significant advance in understanding the generaliza-
tion [SST+18, CRS+19, AUH+19, ZCH+19] and interpretability of learning models [TSE+19]. In computer
security, adversarial robustness serves as an indispensable component towards AI safety against adversarial
threat, in a range of security-critical systems and applications such as autonomous vehicles [EEF+18] and
biometric authorization [TVRG19]. The problem of achieving adversarial robustness can be stated as learning
a classifier with high test accuracy on both natural and adversarial examples. The adversarial example is either
in the form of unrestricted transformations, such as rotation and translation of natural examples, or in the form
of perturbations with bounded norms. The focus of this work is the latter setting.
Probably one of the most successful techniques to enhance model robustness is by adversarial train-
ing [MMS+18, ZYJ+19]. In the adversarial training, the defenders simulate adversarial examples against
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
13
14
5v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
8 S
ep
 20
20
current iteration of model and then feed them into the training procedure in the next round. Despite a large liter-
ature devoted to the study of adversarial training, many fundamental questions remain unresolved. One of the
long-standing questions is the interpretability: although adversarial training is an effective way to defend against
certain adversarial examples, it remains unclear why current designs of network architecture are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks without adversarial training. This question becomes more challenging when we consider the
computational issues. Taking the perspective of Pontryagin Maximum Principle (or Bellman Equation) for
differential games induced by adversarial training, [ZZL+19] reduces adversarial training to merely updating
the weights of the first layer that significantly reduces the computational cost. Yet in optimization, adversarial
training is notorious for its instability due to the non-convex non-concave minimax nature of its loss function.
When the “simulated” adversarial examples in the training procedure do not conceptually match those of
attackers, adversarial training can be vulnerable to adversarial threat as well. This is known as the norm-agnostic
setting, and there is significant evidence to indicate that adversarial training suffers from brittleness against
attacks in `2 and `∞ norms simultaneously [LCWC19]. Furthermore, due to an intrinsic trade-off between
natural accuracy and adversarial robustness [TSE+19, ZYJ+19], adversarial training typically leads to more
than 10% reduction of accuracy compared with natural training.
Stability principle of dynamical systems has been applied to adversarial training to enhance the robustness.
Inspired by the initial value stability of convection-diffusion partial differential equation and the Feynman-Kac
formula of solutions, [WYSO19] designs ResNet ensembles with activation noise that exhibits improvements in
both natural and robust accuracies for adversarial training. Moreover, motivated by the fact in numerical ODEs
that implicit (backward) Euler discretization has better stability than explicit (forward) Euler discretization
that current ResNets exploit, [LHL20] designs implicit Euler based skip-connections to enhance ResNets with
better stability and adversarial robustness. However, all these studies are limited to adversarial training rather
than natural training.
In response to the limitations of adversarial training, designing network architecture towards natural training
as robust as adversarial training has received significant attention in recent years. On one hand, most positive
results for obtaining adversarial robustness have focused on controlling Lipschitz constants explicitly in the
training procedure, such as requiring each convolutional layer be composed of orthonormal filters [CBG+17],
or restricting the spectral radius of the matrix in each layer to be small [QW19]. These approaches, however,
do not achieve comparable robustness as adversarial training against `∞-norm attacks. On the other hand, with
the introduction of ordinary different equations into neural networks [CRBD18], the adversarial robustness for
neural ordinary differential equations (ODEs) network architecture have been attracting rising attention. Yan
et al. [YDTF19] found that ODE networks with natural training is more robust against adversarial examples
compared with traditional conventional neural networks, but the robustness of ODE networks is much weaker
than the state-of-the-art result by adversarial training.
1.1 Our methodology and results
We begin with designing ODE networks analogous to the residual networks. Our ODE network is a natural
extension of the Residual Network: when we solve the ODE system by the explicit (forward) Euler method,
the two types of networks can be made equivalent. Nevertheless, to ensure the output of our networks to be
less sensitive to perturbations in input, we further require our ODE networks to be stable by design. It has
been well known in the dynamical system theory [CD91] that input-output stability is an important property
for a system to be insensitive (and even robust) to input noise and perturbations. We rigorously show that the
resulting networks are stable in the Lyapunov sense, provided that the two weight matrices in each ODE block
are skew-symmetric to each other up to an arbitrarily small damping and the activation function is strictly
monotonically increasing. The design works for both convolutional and fully-connected neural networks.
Our stability analysis naturally leads to a new formulation of network architecture which has several
appealing properties; in particular, it inherits all the benefits of Neural ODE such as parameter- and memory-
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efficiency, adaptive computation, etc., and the algorithm achieves comparable robustness on a range of
benchmarks as the state-of-the-art adversarial training methods. To understand possible reasons behind this
surprisingly good result, we further explore the possible mechanism underlying such an adversarial robustness.
The main contribution and discovery in this report can be summarized as follows.
• Theoretically, we parametrize ODE networks analogous to the residual networks. Our stability analysis
shows that the ODE system is Lyapunov stable, provided that the activation function is strictly monotoni-
cally increasing and the two weight matrices in the ODE block are skew-symmetric with each other, up
to an arbitrarily small damping factor.
• Algorithmically, inspired by our stability analysis, we propose a new formulation of neural ODE network
architecture, named Stabilized neural ODE Network (SONet). The architecture is robust to small
perturbations as each ODE block is provably stable in the sense of Lyapunov.
• Experimentally, we show that natural training of the proposed architecture achieves non-trivial adversarial
robustness in white-box PGD attacks, and even better than the state-of-the-art ResNet10 adversarially
trained by TRADES under white-box `∞ and `2 PGD20 attacks.
• Furthermore, a possible interpretation for the adversarial robustness of ODE-based networks is provided,
suggesting that high order numerical integration methods (DOPRI5) may lead to obfuscated gradients
via large error tolerance with adaptive step size choice, which fails the gradient based attacks like PGD
but may not fool robust gradient attacks like CW and gradient-free attacks like SPSA.
2 Preliminaries
Before proceeding, we define some notations and formalize our model setup in this section.
2.1 Notations
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Figure 1: Network architecture.
We will use bold capital letters such as W to represent matrices,
bold lower-case letters such as x to represent vectors, and lower-
case letters such as t to represent scalars. Specifically, we denote
by 0 the all-zero vector, by 1 the all-one vector, by x ∈ Rdin the
input vector to each architecture block, and by z ∈ Rdout the output
vector, where din does not necessarily equal to dout. Denote by σ(·)
the element-wise activation function, and σ′(·) is its (sub-)gradient.
We will frequently use dx(t)/dt to represent the differential of
x(t) w.r.t. the time variable t. For norms, we denote by ‖ · ‖
a generic norm. Examples of norms include ‖x‖p, the `p norm
of vector x for p ≥ 1. We will use f1 ◦ f2(·) to represent the
composition of two functions f1(·) and f2(·). Denote by B(x, )
a neighborhood of x: {x′ : ‖x− x′‖ ≤ }. Throughout the paper,
for any given loss function L(f,x) and data (set) x, we will term
the optimization procedure minf maxx′∈B(x,) L(f,x′) as adversarial training and term the optimization
procedure minf L(f,x) as natural training.
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2.2 ODE Blocks
In the Residual Networks (ResNets, a.k.a. Euler networks) [HZRS16], the basic blocks follow the architecture1
(see Figure 1(a)):
zk+1 − zk
∆t
= σ(W
(1)
k+1xk),
xk+1 − xk
∆t
= σ(W
(2)
k+1zk+1), (1)
zk = 0, ∆t = 1,
where xk and xk+1 are the input and ouput of the k-th ResNet block, zk+1 is the intermediate layer, and W
(1)
k+1
and W(2)k+1 are the weight matrices which represent either the fully-connected or the convolutional operators.
In the Neural ODE, in constrast, [CRBD18] took the limit of the finite differences over the infinitesimal ∆t
and parameterized the continuous dynamics of hidden units using an ODE specified by a neural network:
xk+1 = fNeuralODE-k(xk; t0) :
dx(t)
dt
= σ(W
(2)
k+1σ(W
(1)
k+1x(t))), x(0) = xk, xk+1 = x(t0), (2)
where xk is the initial condition of x(t), i.e., the input, and the output xk+1 is the evolution of x(t) at time t0.
Our study is motivated by the Neural ODE. We focus on a parametric model similar to ResNet block (1)
(see Figure 1(b)):
dz(t)
dt
= σ(W
(1)
k+1x(t)− γz(t)),
dx(t)
dt
= σ(W
(2)
k+1z(t)− γx(t)), (3)
xk+1 = z(t0), x(0) = xk, z(0) = zk,
where xk and zk are the initial conditions of x(t) and z(t), respectively, γ > 0 is a small positive constant as
the damping factor and the output xk+1 is the evolution of z(t) at time t0. When we solve ODE system (3) by
the Euler solver with time step 1 and set γ to be 0, ODE block (3) is equivalent to ResNet block (1).
Flexibility of parametric model in (4). Compared with the previous Neural ODE [CRBD18] defined in (2),
which can only deal with the case when the size of input xk is equal to the size of output xk+1, the parametric
model in (3) is able to handle the case when dim(xk+1) 6= dim(xk). The intermediate layer z(t) can be viewed
as an auxiliary layer, which makes our model more flexible.
3 Stability of ODE Blocks
In this section, we present our stability analysis for ODE system (3) that serves as a guiding principle in the
design of network architecture against adversarial examples. Our analysis leads to the following guarantee on
the stability of the ODE system.
Theorem 3.1 (Stability of ODE Blocks). Suppose that the activation function σ is strictly monotonically
increasing, i.e., σ′(·) > 0 and positive damping factor γ is small. Let W(2)k+1 = −W(1)>k+1 . Then for any
implementation of network parameters, the forward propagation (3) is stable in the sense of Lyapunov;
that is, for all δ > 0, there exists a stable radius (δ) > 0 such that if ‖x0 − x′0‖ ≤ (δ), we have
‖fODENet-k(x0; t0)− fODENet-k(x′0; t0)‖ ≤ δ for all t0 > 0.
1Without loss of generality, we assume the bias term is a zero vector for simplicity, although our analysis works for the general case
as well.
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Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that there exists a universal stability radius  > 0 (independent of integration
time t0) such that small change of x0 within the -ball causes small change of fODENet-k(x0; t0) for all t0 > 0.
In contrast, the continuity in the original design of Neural ODE [CRBD18] does not justify the existence of such
universal stability radius for all t0 > 0. Our theory shows that the quantity ‖fODENet(x0; t)− fODENet(x′0; t0)‖
does not diverge as t0 grows. So the ODE is robust w.r.t. its initial condition, the input of the network.
Intuition behind the stability. Our ODE block (3) has guaranteed stability without any explicit regularization
on the smoothness of its input and output. To see how the skew-symmetric architecture encourages stability, let
us ignore for now the nonlinear activation σ(·) and γ in the ODE block (3) and consider its linearized version:
d
dt
[
x
z
]
=
[
0 W
(2)
k+1
−W(2)>k+1 0
] [
x
z
]
.
= Ak+1
[
x
z
]
, (4)
xk+1 = z(t), x(0) = xk, z(0) = zk.
As the linear system matrix Ak+1 is skew symmetric, one can show that the solution to the above system is
given by [CD91]: [
x(t)
z(t)
]
= Φ
[
x(0)
z(0)
]
,
where the state-transition matrix Φ is an orthogonal matrix ΦΦ> = I. Hence the input-output of the linearized
system is always norm-preserving. In Appendix A.1, we give a formal proof of stability of the ODE block with
the nonlinear activation, i.e. Theorem 3.1, based on results from system theory [AM10].
Another quantity governing the robustness of a network is its depth. Empirically, deeper networks enjoy
better robustness against adversarial perturbations [MMS+18]. This is probably because the score function
of a ReLU-activated neural network is characterized by a piecewise affine function [CAH18]; deeper neural
network implies smoother approximation of the ground-truth score function. Since ODE networks are provable
deep limit of ResNets [AN19, TvG18], the proposed networks implicitly enjoy the benefits of depth.
4 Architecture Design of ODE Networks
Architecture design of ODE blocks. Theorem 3.1 sheds light on architecture designs of ODE blocks. In
order for the ODE to be stable w.r.t. its input at the inference time, the theorem suggests parametrizing ODE
network (3) with W(2)k+1 = −W(1)Tk+1 and a strictly increasing activation function. We name our network SONet,
standing for Stabilized ODE Network.
Probably the most relevant work to our design is that of [HR17], where [HR17] proposed similar skew-
symmetric architecture, but for the Euler networks. In addition, [HR17] discussed the proposed architecture in
the context of exploding and vanishing gradient phenomenon. In contrast, our work sheds light on algorithmic
designs for adversarial defenses which is different to [HR17]. We show that a good ODE solver for problem (3)
suffices to imply a robust network to adversarial attacks.
Benefits of skew-symmetric architecture. The skew-symmetric architecture of ODE blocks has many struc-
tural benefits that one can exploit. Change of dimensionality: the introduction of the auxiliary variable z ∈ Rdout
enables us to change the dimension of the input and output vectors; that is, the input variable x ∈ Rdin may
have different dimensions as the output variable z ∈ Rdout . This is in sharp contrast to the original design of
Neural ODE [CRBD18], where the input and output vectors of each ODE block must have the same dimension.
Parameter efficiency: the skew-symmetric ODE block has only half number of parameters compared to the
ResNet blocks and the original design of Neural ODE blocks due to parameter sharing. Inference-time robust-
ness: the established architecture enjoys stability (see Theorem 3.1). Furthermore, an expected side-benefit
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Figure 2: Stabilized neural ODE Network (SONet) architecture example. Both fODENet-k and fODENet-class are
built on our stable ODE block defined in (3).
of our design is that it automatically inherits all the benefits of Neural ODE [CRBD18]: memory efficiency,
adaptive computation, invertible normalizing flows, and many others.
Construction of robust ODE networks. Our construction of ODE networks builds upon the architecture
design of ODE block (3).
• Feature-extraction block fODENet-k: The feature blocks aim at extracting the feature of each instance.
For the image classification tasks, the operation of multiplying z with Wk+1 in Eqn. (3) serves as
a convolution operator, and correspondingly, WTk+1 serves as a transposed convolution (a.k.a. de-
convolution) operator which shares a common kernel with Wk+1. The input and output dimensions din
and dout are equal. We set the initial condition zk as xk, the input of the ODE block.
• Classification block fclass: At the top layer of the network is the classification block which is characterized
by a fully-connected operator, mapping the extracted feature to the confidence value associated with each
class. The matrix Wk+1 parametrizes the weight matrix of the fully-connected layer and WTk+1 is its
transpose. The input dimension din and the output dimension dout are equal to the feature size and the
number of classes, respectively, so din might not equal to dout. We set the initial condition zk = z(0) as
1. This is conceptually consistent with the argument that we have no prior knowledge on the true label of
any given instance.
Our ODE network is therefore a stack of various building blocks:
fODENet(x0; t) := fclass ◦ gpooling ◦ fODENet-L ◦ · · · ◦ fODENet-0 ◦ gchannel-copy(x0), (5)
where x0 is the input instance, L is the number of layers, gpooling represents the average pooling operator, and
gchannel-copy is the “channel-copy” layer which copies x0 along the channel direction in order to increase the
width of the network. The function fODENet : X → RC is the score function which maps an instance to logits
over classes. An example network is shown in Figure 2, this example consists 5 feature-extraction blocks, a
pooling layer and a classification block.
Comparisons with prior work. We compare our approach with several related lines of research in the prior
work. One of the best known algorithms for adversarial robustness is based on adversarial training. The
algorithms approximately solve a minimax problem
min
f
n∑
i=1
{
max
x′
(i)
∈B(x(i),)
P(f,x′(i))
}
,
where x(i) represents the i-th instance, and P(·, ·) is the payoff function between defender and attacker, which
captures the smoothness of model f in an explicit manner; examples of P(f,x′(i)) include robust optimization
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L(f(x′(i)),y(i)) [MMS+18] and TRADES L(f(x′(i)),y(i)) + βL(f(x′(i)), f(x(i))) [ZYJ+19], where L is the
cross-entropy loss and y(i) is the one-hot label. Prior to ours, random smoothing [CRK19] and stability
training [ZSLG16] are other techniques towards natural training as robust as adversarial training by adding
small Gaussian noises to the input images. Our work, on the other hand, is paralleled to these two lines of
research as we focus on the network architecture design. The combination of these methods may further
enhance the robustness of learning systems.
Another more related line of research is by network architecture design. Parseval networks [CBG+17]
and L2-nonexpansive neural networks [QW19] explicitly bounded the Lipschitz constant by either requiring
each fully-connected or convolutional layer be composed of orthonormal filters [CBG+17], or restricting the
spectral radius of the matrix in each layer to be small [QW19]. In complex problem domains, however, the
explicit Lipschitz constraints may negatively affect the expressive power of the networks and overly trade off
natural accuracy against adversarial robustness. Xie et al. [XWM+19] involved non-local mean denoiser in the
architecture design of ResNet. But the model is vulnerable to attcks without adversarial training. [SMM+19]
proposed PeerNets, a family of convolutional networks alternating classical Euclidean convolutions with
graph convolutions. Yan et al. [YDTF19] explored robustness properties of neural ODEs and proposed the
time-invariant steady neural ODE (TisODE), which regularizes the flow on perturbed data. But the model is
weak under PGD attacks. In contrast, in this work, we explore the possibility of enhancing robustness for
classic (non-graph) networks with natural training.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of SONet against adversarial attacks. We use Anat(f) to denote the
natural accuracy of the model, andArob(f) to denote the robust accuracy against adversarial attacks. Additional
experiments are provided in Appendix.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We first introduce the experimental setup for datasets, deep neural network architectures, adversarial attacks
and adversarial defense methods.
ResNet: We apply the ResNet with 10 layers as the baseline model, denoted by ResNet10. Compared with
ResNet18 with 2-layer basic block, we use 1-layer basic block for ResNet10. The first layer of ResNet10 is the
convolution layer with Batchnorm [IS15] and ReLU activation, then followed by four 1-layer residual basic
blocks. Within each basic block there are two convolution layers. Average pooling is applied after the residual
blocks and the last layer is a fully connected layer with softmax.
SONet: We apply our stable skew-symmetric ODE block (defined in Eqn. (3)) as the building block in the
SONet. More specifically, we replace each residual basic block in the ResNet10 architecture with the proposed
stable skew-symmetric ODE block. Besides the replaced residual blocks, as shown in Figure 2, we replace the
same first convolution layer with the stable ODE block fODENet-0, and replace the last fully connected linear
layer with the stable ODE block fODENet-class.
SOBlock: We replace the first convolution layer in ResNet10 above by our proposed skew-symmetric
ODE block (defined in Eqn. (3)) and leave the other parts unchanged.
Additionally, in order to compare the performance of SONet, SOBlock and ResNet with different number
of parameters, we scale the model capacity by changing the input channel from 32 to 64.
Adversarial attacks: For White-Box attacks, we focus on `∞-norm, `2-norm projected gradient descent
(PGD) and CW∞ [CW17] adversairal attacks to evaluate the adversarial robustness of different models. For `∞
PGD attack, the update rule is defined as x′i ← ΠB∞(xi,)(x′i + η1 sign(∇x′iL(f(x′(i)),y(i)))), where ΠB∞(·,·)
is the projection operator with respect to `∞-norm, L is the cross-entropy loss, x′i is initialized as the original
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input xi,  is the adversarial perturbation distance, and η1 is the attack step size. For `2 PGD attack, the
update rule is defined as x′i ← ΠB2(xi,)(x′i + η1 norm2(∇x′iL(f(x′(i)),y(i)))), where ΠB2(·,·) is the projection
operator with respect to `2-norm, and the norm2 is the normalization operator, i.e., norm2(x) = x/‖x‖2. For
CW∞ attack, it minimizes c · f(x+ δ) + ‖δ‖∞ with respect to δ such that x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n where c > 0 is a
suitably chosen constant. For Black-Box attack, we use simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation
(SPSA) [UOOK18] adversarial attack which is one of the most powerful gradient free attacks and it minimizes
mθ(x)y0−maxj 6=y0 mθ(x)j with respect to x such that ‖x− x0‖∞ <  where mθ(x)j denotes the output logit
for the class j and y0 is the true label. Unless explicitly stated, on CIFAR10 dataset, we set the perturbation
distance  = 0.031, the attack step size η1 = 0.003 for `∞ PGD attack, and we set the perturbation distance
 = 0.5, the attack step size η1 = 0.1 for `2 PGD attack. For CW∞ attack, we set the perturbation distance
 = 0.031, the max-iterations K = 100. And we apply the  = 0.031, the number of iterations K = 20 and
the number of samples to be 32 for SPSA attack.
Adversarial training: We use TRADES [ZYJ+19] as our adversarial training baselines for comparison.
We do not compare with other adversarial training approaches because TRADES is known as the state-of-the-art
defense method which won the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challange [BRK+20]. On CIFAR10 dataset,
we set the `∞ perturbation distance  = 0.031, perturbation step size η1 = 0.007, number of iterations K = 10
for TRADES. For TRADES, we train two models and set the regularization parameter as 1/λ = 1.0 and
1/λ = 6.0.
Training settings: On CIFAR10 dataset, for all mentioned models, we set the total epoch T = 350, batch
size B = 100, the initial learning rate η = 0.01 (decay 0.1 at 150 and 300 epochs respectively), and apply
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum 0.9 as the optimizer. No weight decay is used during
training. Unless explicitly stated, for all skew-symmetric ODE blocks, we set the constant γ in (3) to be 0 and
use DOPRI5 solver which is an adaptive solver with 0.1 error tolerance.
5.2 Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Attacks
We shall see that our proposed network, SONet, is able to achieve nontrivial `2 and `∞ white-box PGD robust
accuracy on CIFAR10 dataset, only with natrual training. Moreover, SOBlock even outperforms ResNet10 with
TRADES training with regard to both natural accuracy and robust accuracy on both PGD20 and PGD1000 attacks,
although TRADES is able to achieve a better tradeoff compared with standard adversarial training [ZYJ+19].
5.2.1 Better robustness of SONet in natural training than TRADES adv-training in PGD20 attacks
Under PGD20 attacks, SONet with natural training achieves better robust accuracy than TRADES-adversarial
training, without sacrificing natural accuracy. The robust accuracy against 20-step PGD attack is a common
metric for evaluating `∞ adversarial robustness [MMS+18, ZYJ+19]. We summarize the natural accuracyAnat
and robust accuracy Arob under PGD adversarial attacks on different models in Table 1, where we use PGDk∗ to
denote the k-step iterative PGD attack within ∗-norm box. The natural accuracy of SONet with 32-channel and
64-channel are 88.08% and 89.36% respectively, significantly better than that of ResNet10 with 32-channel
and 64-channel deteriorates as 81.52% and 82.74% trained by TRADES (1/λ = 1.0). Under PGD20∞ attack,
our proposed SONet with 64-channel can achieve 61.62% robust accuracy, which is significantly better than
the corresponding ResNet10 model with TRADES training (both 1/λ = 1.0 and 1/λ = 6.0).
We also evaluate both models against PGD202 (`2-norm  = 0.5) adversarial attack. We can observe that
SONet is robust against PGD202 attack, and achieves better robust accuracy than ResNet10 trained by TRADES.
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5.2.2 Nontrivial robustness of SONet under PGD1,000 attacks
In addition to the PGD20 attack, we also conduct PGD attacks with more attack steps to better approximate
the worst-case attacks. The robust accuracy of all the models decreases with more attack steps (1,000 step),
especially for `∞ attacks. However, SONet can still achieve 24.25% and 39.79% robust accuracy against
PGD1,000∞ and PGD1,0002 attacks, respectively. Such a decay is worse than TRADES-adversarial training that
achieves robust accuracy at 44.70% (1/λ = 6.0) and 58.73% (1/λ = 1.0), but is still non-trivial. Therefore,
adversarial robustness of SONet deteriorates but is still nontrivial under further iterative attack steps in PGD1000.
However, a better performance can be achieved by SOBlock below.
5.2.3 Improved robustness of SOBlock at the first layer than full SONet
A surprising observation is that by only adopting stablized neural ODE block in the first layer of ResNet10,
SOBlock achieves even better performance than SONet that using all layers as such blocks. In Table 1, the
natural accuracy of SOBlock with 32-channel and 64-channel are 90.28% and 91.57% respectively while
maintains PGD1000∞ robust accuracy with 52.01% and 55.43% respectively which is much higher than 45.24%
and 44.70% achieved by TRADES (1/λ = 6.0).
SOBlock almost achieves the best performance among nearly in all settings, except for PGD10002 attack
it has a comparative robust accuracy with TRADES. In addition to achieving such a high performance in
accuracy, SOBlock particularly enjoys much less computational and memory cost than SONet, that is favoured
in applications.
5.3 Robustness of SOBlock as a result from Adaptive Stepsize in Numerical Integration
To investigate the reason of adversarial robustness of SOBlock under PGD attacks, we conduct an ablation
study on the influence of different order of numerical ODE solvers together with their choice of step size and
error tolerance. We use WRN-34-10 as our base network for SOBlock in this section in order to obtain better
comparison and the experiments below suggest that adversarial robustness of SOBlock results from gradient
masking effect of DOPRI5, an adaptive stepsize numerial ODE solver.
5.3.1 Adversiarial robustness is only associated with DOPRI5 with adaptive stepsize
In the first experiment, we compared three different choices of ODE solvers: Euler method (first order, fixed
step size h = 1), RK4 (fourth order, fixed step size h = 1), and DOPRI5 (fourth order, adaptive step size, with
default error tolerance tol = 0.1). In Table 2, it shows that only DOPRI5 leads to adversarial robustness of
SOBlock against PGD attacks, while SOBlocks trained by Euler and RK4 totally fail under both PGD20 and
PGD1000 in spite of high natural accuracy.
The same phenomenon persists when we change SOBlock to traditional ODENet [CRBD18] without using
the skew-symmetric stabilization in (4). Altough ODENet slightly drops the natural accuracy as desired, one
can see in Table 2 that robust accuracy of ODENet with both Euler and RK4 training totally fails (0%), while
DOPRI5 shows nontrivial robust accuracy under PGD20 and PGD1000.
5.3.2 High error tolerance in DOPRI5 improves adversarial robustness
Both RK4 and DOPRI5 are fourth order numerical ordinary differential equation methods, where DOPRI5
enjoys a simple error estimate for adaptive stepsize choice [DP80]. In DOPRI5, it uses six function evaluations
to calculate both fourth- and fifth-order accurate solutions, whose difference is taken as the error estimate of the
fourth-order solution. Adaptive stepsize is adopted in DOPRI5 when the error estimate is within the tolerance
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specified by tol. Therefore in the second experiment, we investigate the influence of changing error tolerance
tol in DOPRI5.
In Table 2, one can see that large error tolerance increases the robustness of both SOBlock and ODENet,
e.g. PGD20∞-robust accuracy at 71.20% at tol = 0.1 against 63.86% at tol = 0.001 for SOBlock and 42.69%
at tol = 0.1 against 36.19% at tol = 0.001. Large error tolerance leads to large perturbations on adaptive
stepsize in DOPRI5, e.g. Table 4 shows that increasing tolerance from tol = 0.001 to tol = 0.1 lead to
enlarged adaptive stepsize perturbations from the order of 1e− 3 to 1e− 2.
These phenomena above show that adversarial robustness under PGD attacks is a result from the adaptive
stepsize choice of numerical ODE solver DOPRI5 that perturbs the gradients of loss functions, where enlarging
error tolerance increases the robustness of SOBlocks and ODENets. Therefore, DOPRI5 contributes such a
kind of gradient masking against PGD attacks: large error tolerance in numerical function estimate leads to
large perturbations of gradients that fools the projected gradient descent in attacks.
5.4 Robust Gradient (CW) and Gradient-Free (SPSA) Attacks
To further justify our reasoning above that the adversarial robustness of SOBlock and SONet is due to the
gradient masking effect of DOPRI5, an adaptive stepsize numerical ODE solver, we further conduct experiments
under two sorts of new attacks, CW attack that has robust gradients due to the use of hinge loss and SPSA
attack that is a kind of gradient-free attack.
Table 3 shows that in spite of the impressive robustness under PGD attacks, both SONet and SOBlock are
vulnerable under CW∞ and SPSA attacks, while ResNet10 trained with TRADES still has relatively strong
robustness. Particularly, under CW∞ attack, SOBlock (SONet) with 64 channels has 0% (11.20%) robust
accuracy compared with ResNet10 in TRADES training at 39.77% (1/λ = 6); while under SPSA attack,
SOBlock (SONet) of 64 channels has 11.68% (15.10%) robust accuracy compared with TRADES training at
69.97% (1/λ = 1). This provides a support of the gradient masking by DOPRI5, that fails to fool CW and
SPSA attacks which are not as sensitive to gradients of cross entropy loss as PGD attacks.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a stabilized neural ODE architecture based on a skew-symmetric dynamical system
with probable Lyapunov stability. We show that such an ODE based network architecture can achieve some state-
of-the-art adversarial robustness with natural training against PGD attacks, without sacrificing natural accuracy
that is suffered by popular adversarial training methods such as TRADES. To understand this phenomenon, we
further explore the possible mechanism underlying such an adversarial robustness. We show that the adaptive
stepsize numerial ODE solver, DOPRI5, has a gradient masking effect that fails the PGD attacks which are
sensitive to gradient information of training loss, while it can not fool the CW attack of robust gradients and
the SPSA attack that is gradient-free. This provides a new explanation that the adversarial robustness of ODE
based networks is mainly due to the obfuscated gradients in numerical ODE solvers.
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Table 1: Comparisons between SONet, SOBlock with natural training and ResNet10 with TRADES under
white-box PGD adversarial attacks on CIFAR10 dataset.
Model Channel Under which attack Anat(f) Arob(f)
 = 0.031(`∞)  = 0.5(`2)
SONet 32 PGD20 88.08% 53.67% 57.39%
SOBlock 32 PGD20 90.28% 58.21% 60.25%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 1.0) 32 PGD20 81.52% 35.26% 57.07%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 6.0) 32 PGD20 73.69% 43.46% 55.73%
SONet 64 PGD20 89.36% 61.62% 64.08%
SOBlock 64 PGD20 91.57% 62.35% 64.70%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 1.0) 64 PGD20 82.74% 37.64% 58.97%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 6.0) 64 PGD20 76.29% 45.24% 57.28%
SONet 32 PGD1,000 88.08% 19.62% 31.75%
SOBlock 32 PGD1,000 90.28% 52.01% 52.79%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 1.0) 32 PGD1,000 81.52% 33.60% 56.70%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 6.0) 32 PGD1,000 73.69% 43.30% 55.48%
SONet 64 PGD1,000 89.36% 24.25% 39.79%
SOBlock 64 PGD1,000 91.57% 55.43% 57.37%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 1.0) 64 PGD1,000 82.74% 35.78% 58.73%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 6.0) 64 PGD1,000 76.29% 44.70% 56.87%
A Appendices
A.1 Proofs of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1 (Stability of ODE Block). Suppose that the activation function σ is strictly monotonically
increasing, i.e., σ′(·) > 0 and positive damping factor γ is small. Let W(2)k+1 = −W(1)Tk+1 . Then for any
implementation of network parameters, the forward propagation (3) is stable in the sense of Lyapunov;
that is, for all δ > 0, there exists a stable radius (δ) > 0 such that if ‖x0 − x′0‖ ≤ (δ), we have
‖fODENet-k(x0; t0)− fODENet-k(x′0; t0)‖ ≤ δ for all t0 > 0.
Proof. We observe that Eqn. (3) has an equivalent expression, xk+1 = fODENet(xk; t0):
d
dt
[
x
z
]
= σ
([
0 −W>k+1
Wk+1 0
] [
x
z
]
− γI
[
x
z
])
,
x(0) = xk, z(0) = zk, xk+1 := z(t0).
Denote by
Ak+1 :=
[
0 −W>k+1
Wk+1 0
]
.
Note that Ak+1 is a skew-symmetric matrix such that Ak+1 = −A>k+1. So Re[λi(Ak+1)] ≤ 0 for all i, where
Re[·] represents the real part of a complex variable and λi(Ak+1) is the i-th eigenvalue of matrix Ak+1.
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Table 2: Comparisons between SOBlock and ODENet with different solver ODE solvers under PGD adversarial
attacks on CIFAR10 dataset.
Model Solver Anat(f) Arob(f)
PGD20 PGD1000
SOBlock Euler 94.41% 0% 0%
SOBlock RK4 92.06% 0% 0%
SOBlock Dopri5(tol=0.1) 94.22% 71.20% 63.20%
SOBlock Dopri5(tol=0.01) 93.98% 64.66% 46.40%
SOBlock Dopri5(tol=0.001) 94.32% 63.87% 46.20%
ODENet Euler 87.04% 0% 0%
ODENet RK4 87.78% 0% 0%
ODENet Dopri5(tol=0.1) 87.41% 42.69% 13.14%
ODENet Dopri5(tol=0.01) 87.46% 37.20% 8.36%
ODENet Dopri5(tol=0.001) 87.54% 36.19% 7.75%
We note that an ODE system is stable if Re[λi(Jk+1)] < 0 [AM10], where Jk+1 is the Jacobian of the
ODE:
Jk+1 := ∇[x;z]
(
σ
([
0 −W>k+1
Wk+1 0
] [
x
z
]
− γI
[
x
z
]))
=: Dk+1(Ak+1 − γI),
where we have defined
Dk+1 := Diag
(
σ′
([ −γ −W>k+1
Wk+1 −γ
] [
x
z
]))
.
Because σ′(·) > 0, the matrix D−1/2k+1 exists. We observe that
Jk+1 ∼ D1/2k+1(Ak+1 − γI)D1/2k+1,
where the notation ∼ means the two matrices are similar. Since similar matrices have the same eigenvalues, for
all i, we have
λi(Jk+1) = λi(D
1/2
k+1(Ak+1 − γI)D1/2k+1). (6)
For the right hand side in Eqn. (6), Re[λi(Ak+1)] ≤ 0 So Re[λi(Ak+1 − γI)] < 0, and matrix Dk+1 is
positive diagonal. Combining with Eqn. (6), we have Re[λi(Jk+1)] < 0. Thus, we have ‖(x(t), z(t))‖ ≤
‖(x(0), z(0))‖ and when we set the initial condition z(0) = z(k) = x(k), there holds ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ‖(x(t), z(t))‖ ≤
‖(x(0), z(0))‖ ≤ √2‖x(0)‖ for any t > t0. Alternatively, one can also achieve ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ‖(x(t), z(t))‖ ≤
‖(x(0), z(0))‖ = ‖x(0)‖ if we choose initialization z(0) = 0. Finally, the Lyapunov stability is valid with
respect to Euclidean `2-norm. For other equivalent `p-norms (1 ≤ p ≤ ∞), the result holds up to a constant
that depends on the input dimension. The proof is completed.
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Table 3: Comparisons between SONet, SOBlock with natural training and ResNet10 with TRADES under
CW∞ and SPSA adversarial attacks on CIFAR10 dataset.
Model Channel Anat(f) Arob(f)
CW-Linf SPSA
SONet 32 88.08% 0% 2.50%
SOBlock 32 90.28% 0% 7.64%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 1) 32 81.52% 37.61% 68.30%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 6) 32 73.69% 38.92% 63.60%
SONet 64 89.36% 11.20% 15.10%
SOBlock 64 91.57% 0% 11.68%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 1) 64 82.74% 35.78% 69.97%
ResNet10-TRADES (1/λ = 6) 64 76.29% 39.77% 65.97%
Table 4: Adaptive steps with ODENet under different dopri5 tolerances and PGD∞ attack iterations
Solver PGD iterations Adaptive steps
Dopri5(tol=0.1)
1 [0.0, 0.262, 1.0]
100 [0.0, 0.253, 1.0]
1000 [0.0, 0.244, 1.0]
Dopri5(tol=0.01)
1 [0.0, 0.155, 0.827, 1.0]
100 [0.0, 0.150, 0.793, 1.0]
1000 [0.0, 0.149, 0.789, 1.0]
Dopri5(tol=0.001)
1 [0.0, 0.097, 0.423, 1.0]
100 [0.0, 0.096, 0.420, 1.0]
1000 [0.0, 0.094, 0.409, 0.981, 1.0]
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